Security model

The MCP integration sits on the visitor-facing hot path and reaches third-party servers. The security model below is the defence-in-depth applied at every layer.

SSRF protection

• The server URL is rejected at form-validation time if it points at a private, loopback, link-local, or cloud-metadata address.
• The same guard runs again at every outbound call with DNS rebind protection — an attacker who controls DNS for a public hostname they own cannot redirect the call to 127.0.0.1.
• Only http:// and https:// schemes are accepted.

Credential isolation

• Stored credentials are encrypted at rest via Laravel's encrypted:array cast.
• The credential resolver is the only code path that touches decrypted credentials. Every other layer works with an assembled Authorization header string on a per-call DTO.
• Octane workers never hold credentials between requests — the DTO is constructed per call.

Prompt-injection defence

Every tool result is wrapped in <tool-result trusted="false"> tags. The system prompt explicitly tells the LLM that anything inside such tags is data, not instructions, and not to follow links or commands found inside. Same pattern as the existing <source> RAG wrapping.

Output budget enforcement

Tool outputs are truncated to a per-tool token budget (default 1200) before being fed back to the LLM. A misbehaving server returning multi-megabyte responses is capped at 1MB by the transport layer; the token truncator caps oversized but legitimate responses.

Rate limit + circuit breaker

• Per-workspace rate limit: 60 MCP calls per minute by default. Excess attempts return a structured "rate_limited" tool result to the LLM.
• Per-server circuit breaker: 5 failures in 60s open the breaker for 60s. While open, calls return a structured "unavailable" tool result without hitting the server.

Tenancy

Servers, tools, grants, and call logs are scoped by workspace_id via the BelongsToWorkspace trait. The widget hot path resolves the agent from the signed JWT, then queries through the registry which never reads CurrentWorkspace directly. Cross-tenant attempts return 404 on admin routes (existence-leak-safe).